Strategic information revelation in fundraising
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Information revelation in auctions
Auction theory has emphasized the importance of private information to the profits of bidders. However, the theory has failed to consider the question of whether or not bidders will be able to keep their information private. We show that in a variety of contexts bidders will reveal all their information, even if this information revelation is (ex ante) detrimental to them. Similarly, a seller m...
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متن کاملMediation = Information Revelation + Analogical Reasoning
This paper presents an initial study of the relevant issues on the development of an automated mediation agent. The work is conducted within the ‘curious negotiator’ framework [1]. The paper demonstrates that mediation is a knowledge intensive process that integrates information revelation and analogical reasoning. The introduced formalism is used to demonstrate how via revealing the appropriat...
متن کاملMediation = Information revelation + Analogical reasoning
This paper presents an initial study of the relevant issues on the development of an automated mediation agent. The work is conducted within the ?curious negotiator? framework [1]. The paper demonstrates that mediation is a knowledge intensive process that integrates information revelation and analogical reasoning. The introduced formalism is used to demonstrate how via revealing the appropriat...
متن کاملTrade and revelation of information
We consider an economy with asymmetric information and two types of agents, fully informed and uninformed. Uninformed agents update their information observing equilibrium prices and the equilibrium levels of other agents’ excess demand. We show that, for a generic set of economies, there are rational expectations equilibria which are partially revealing on an open, dense set of signals of posi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economics
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0047-2727
DOI: 10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00106-2