Strategic Information Processing from Behavioural Data in Iterated Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategic Information Processing from Behavioural Data in Iterated Games
Iterated games are an important framework of economic theory and application, at least since the original work of Axelrod’s computational tournaments of the early 80’s. Recent theoretical results have shown that games (the economic context) and game theory (the decision-making process) are both formally equivalent to computational logic gates. Here these results are extended to behavioural data...
متن کاملBehavioural studies of strategic thinking in games.
Game theory is a mathematical language for describing strategic interactions, in which each player's choice affects the payoff of other players (where players can be genes, people, companies, nation-states, etc.). The impact of game theory in psychology has been limited by the lack of cognitive mechanisms underlying game-theoretic predictions. 'Behavioural game theory' is a recent approach link...
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Iterated games, in which the same economic interaction is repeatedly played between the same agents, are an important framework for understanding the effectiveness of strategic choices over time. To date, very little work has applied information theory to the information sets used by agents in order to decide what action to take next in such strategic situations. This article looks at the mutua...
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Iterated games, in which the same economic interaction is repeatedly played between the same agents, are an important framework for understanding the effectiveness of strategic choices over time. To date very little work has applied information theory to the information sets used by agents in order to decide what action to take next in such strategic situations. This article looks at the mutual...
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In this paper we conduct laboratory experiments to test the Crawford and Sobel [Crawford, V., Sobel, J., 1982. Strategic information transmission. Econometrica 50, 1431–1451] theory of strategic information transmission. Our experimental results strongly support the basic insight of the theory, namely, that less information is transmitted when preferences of the sender and the receiver diverge....
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Entropy
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1099-4300
DOI: 10.3390/e20010027