Strategic information and non-cooperative games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cooperative Strategic Games
We examine a solution concept, called the “value,” for n-person strategic games. In applications, the value provides an a-priori assessment of the monetary worth of a player’s position in a strategic game, comprising not only the player’s contribution to the total payoff but also the player’s ability to inflict losses on other players. A salient feature is that the value takes account of the co...
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Non-cooperative games are mathematical models of interactive strategic decision situations. In contrast to cooperative models, they build on the assumption that all possibilities for commitment and contract have been incorporated in the rules of the game. This contribution describes the main models (games in normal form, and games in extensive form), as well as the main concepts that have been ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Kodai Mathematical Journal
سال: 1960
ISSN: 0386-5991
DOI: 10.2996/kmj/1138844293