Strategic gradual learning and information transmission
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategic information transmission networks
We study a model of multi-player communication. Privately informed decision makers have different preferences about the actions they take, and communicate to influence each others’ actions in their favor. We prove that the equilibrium capability of any player to send a truthful message to a set of players depends not only on the preference composition of those players, but also on the number of...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.006