Strategic fragmented markets

نویسندگان

چکیده

We study the determinants of asset market fragmentation in a model with strategic investors that disagree about value an asset. Investors’ choices determine structure. Fragmented markets are supported equilibrium when disagreement between is low. In this case, take same side and willing to trade smaller higher price impact face less competition trading against dealer. The maximum degree increases as investors’ priors more correlated. Dealers can benefit from fragmentation, but always better off centralized markets.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Financial Economics

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['1879-2774', '0304-405X']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.08.022