Strategic Delegation in Price Competition
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Delegation , Worker Compensation , and Strategic Competition
We study interfirm competition on a product market where effort decisions are delegated to the firms’ workers. Intrafirm organization is captured by a principal-multiagent framework where firm owners implement alternative compensation schemes for the workers. We show that the value of delegation as well as the optimal design of the compensation scheme crucially depend on the intensity of compet...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics Letters
سال: 2012
ISSN: 2162-2078,2162-2086
DOI: 10.4236/tel.2012.24065