Strategic coalitions in stochastic games

Joint Learning in Stochastic Games: Playing Coordination Games Within Coalitions

Despite the progress in multiagent reinforcement learning via formalisms based on stochastic games, these have difficulties coping with a high number of agents due to the combinatorial explosion in the number of joint actions. One possible way to reduce the complexity of the problem is to let agents form groups of limited size so that the number of the joint actions is reduced. This paper inves...

Strategic Coalitions with Perfect Recall

The paper proposes a bimodal logic that describes an interplay between distributed knowledge modality and coalition know-how modality. Unlike other similar systems, the one proposed here assumes perfect recall by all agents. Perfect recall is captured in the system by a single axiom. The main technical results are the soundness and the completeness theorems for the proposed logical system.

Dynamic system of strategic games

Maybe an event can't be modeled completely through one game but there is more chance with several games. With emphasis on players' rationality, we present new properties of strategic games, which result in production of other games. Here, a new attitude to modeling will be presented in game theory as dynamic system of strategic games and its some applications such as analysis of the clash betwe...

Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions∗

While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming voters behave randomly. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave differently from the indices predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic behaviour.

Strategic Coalitions in the Information Technology Industry