Strategic claim games corresponding to an NTU-game

Strong convexity of NTU games

In this paper, we provide an alternative definition of NTU convexity, strongly ordinal convexity. We show that if a game is strongly ordinal convex, then any marginal worth vector is in the core, and any marginal contribution is increasing. Some economic examples satisfy this convexity. KeywordsCooperative game; Convex game; NTU game; Core; Supermodularity JEL classification codes: C62; D52; D53

Fractional Solutions for NTU-Games

In this paper we survey some applications of Scarf’s Lemma. First, we introduce the notion of fractional core for NTU-games, which is always nonempty by the Lemma. Stable allocation is a general solution concept for games where both the players and their possible cooperations can have capacities. We show that the problem of finding a stable allocation, given a finitely generated NTU-game with c...

An NTU Cooperative Game Theoretic View of Manipulating Elections

Social choice theory and cooperative (coalitional) game theory have become important foundations for the design and analysis of multiagent systems. In this paper, we use cooperative game theory tools in order to explore the coalition formation process in the coalitional manipulation problem. Unlike earlier work on a cooperative-game-theoretic approach to the manipulation problem [2], we conside...

Dynamic system of strategic games

Maybe an event can't be modeled completely through one game but there is more chance with several games. With emphasis on players' rationality, we present new properties of strategic games, which result in production of other games. Here, a new attitude to modeling will be presented in game theory as dynamic system of strategic games and its some applications such as analysis of the clash betwe...

A Value for Cephoidal NTU-Games