Strategic Capacity Management When Customers Have Boundedly Rational Expectations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Production and Operations Management
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1059-1478
DOI: 10.1111/poms.12420