Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed Prices
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed Prices
A model of finitely repeated price competition between two sellers with differentiated goods and a large buyer is analyzed. The set of pure strategy sequential equilibria is investigated under public and private monitoring. With private monitoring, i.e. when prices are not observable to the competing sellers, all sales are made by the better seller and the set of repeated game equilibrium payof...
متن کاملStrategic Buyers and Privately Observed Prices by Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Välimäki Cowles Foundation Paper No. 1079 Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics
1 1 The authors thank the participants of the Cowles Foundation Conference ''Repeated Games with Private Monitoring'' for helpful remarks. Detailed comments by two anonymous referees and an associate editor greatly improved the note. The authors acknowledge financial support from NSF Grants 9709887 and 9709340, respectively. The second author thanks the Helsinki School of Economics for its hosp...
متن کاملLearning Prices for Repeated Auctions with Strategic Buyers
Inspired by real-time ad exchanges for online display advertising, we consider the problem of inferring a buyer’s value distribution for a good when the buyer is repeatedly interacting with a seller through a posted-price mechanism. We model the buyer as a strategic agent, whose goal is to maximize her long-term surplus, and we are interested in mechanisms that maximize the seller’s long-term r...
متن کاملManaging Strategic Buyers∗
We consider the problem of a monopolist who must sell her inventory before some deadline, facing n buyers with independent private values. The monopolist posts prices but has no commitment power. The seller faces a basic trade-off between imperfect price discrimination and maintaining an effective reserve price. When there is only one unit and only a few buyers, the seller essentially posts una...
متن کاملPrice Experimentation with Strategic Buyers∗
There are many situations in which buyers have a significant stake in what a firm learns about their demands. Specifically, any time that price discrimination is possible on an individual bases and repeat purchases are likely, buyers possess incentives for strategic manipulation of demand information. A simple two-period model in which a monopolist endeavors to learn about the demand parameter ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2891