Strategic Bidding Behaviors in Nondecreasing Sponsored Search Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategic bidder behavior in sponsored search auctions
We examine prior and current sponsored search auctions and find evidence of strategic bidder behavior. Between June 15, 2002, and June 14, 2003, we estimate that Overture’s revenue from sponsored search could have been more than 60% higher if it had been able to prevent this strategic behavior. We also show that advertisers’ strategic behavior has not disappeared over time; rather, such behavio...
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We analyze symmetric pure strategy equilibria in dynamic sponsored search auction games using simulations, restricting the strategies to several in a class of greedy bidding strategies introduced by Cary et al. We show that a particular convergent strategy, “balanced bidding”, also exhibits high stability to deviations in the dynamic setting. On the other hand, a cooperative strategy which yiel...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Problems in Engineering
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1024-123X,1563-5147
DOI: 10.1155/2013/206386