Strategic behavior in repeated voluntary contribution experiments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategic behavior in repeated voluntary contribution experiments
We conduct a repeated VCM (voluntary contribution mechanism) experiment using the strategy method. We compare a partner and a stranger design and find that participants in the partner treatment provide (i) higher initial contributions, (ii) higher contributions on average over all periods, and (iii) contributions that do not vary more strongly with past contributions than participants in the st...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economics
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0047-2727
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.10.004