Strategic Behavior in IEAs: When and Why Countries Joined the Kyoto Protocol
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategic behavior in IEAs : When and why countries joined the Kyoto Protocol ∗
We empirically analyze the formation of international environmental agreements within a political economy framework. We develop a theoretical model of state dependent net benefits of ratification predicting (i) strategic behavior with respect to the timing of ratification and (ii) that ratification per se is not necessarily a stronger signal of support compared to signature. Analyzing the signa...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1549612