منابع مشابه
Strategic Behavior in Matching Markets
Centralized two-sided markets, such as the market for medical residents, often rely on a stable matching mechanism to determine a matching between participants. Because no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is always some room in these markets for strategic misrepresentation. In this paper we study optimal strategic misrepresent...
متن کاملStrategic behavior in power markets under uncertainty
We consider a setting of a two settlement power market where firms compete in the forward market and an uncertain real-time market. A recourse-based framework is proposed where firms make simultaneous bids in the forward market and take recourse in the real-time market contingent on the realization of uncertainty. The market participants include both generation firms as well as the independent ...
متن کاملStrategic Behavior in Unbalanced Matching Markets∗
In this paper we explore how the balance of agents on the two sides of a matching market impacts their potential for strategic manipulation. Coles and Shorrer [5] previously showed that in large, balanced, uniform markets using the Men-Proposing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm, each woman’s best response to truthful behavior by all other agents is to truncate her list substantially. In fact, the ...
متن کاملHerd Behavior in Efficient Financial Markets
Rational herd behavior and informationally efficient security prices have long been considered to be mutually exclusive but for exceptional cases. In this paper we describe conditions on the underlying information structure that are necessary and sufficient for informational herding. Employing a standard sequential security trading model, we argue that people may be subject to herding if and on...
متن کاملHerding and Contrarian Behavior in Financial Markets
Rational herd behavior and informationally efficient security prices have long been considered to be mutually exclusive but for exceptional cases. In this paper we describe the conditions on the underlying information structure that are necessary and sufficient for informational herding and contrarianism. In a standard sequential security trading model, subject to sufficient noise trading, peop...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Economics
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0304-4068
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.09.004