Strategic behavior in contests with heterogeneous agents: Evidence from the Field
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
We study monotone equilibrium behavior in contests with observable effort (bid) where three or more participants have distinct risk attitudes and the monetary value for the prize of each is drawn independently from a distinct distribution. These differences can either cause a player to drop out, that is always choose zero effort regardless of his valuation, or use “all-or-nothing” strategies wi...
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In this paper, I examine the effect of introducing heterogeneity between players in models of strategic experimentation. I consider a two-armed bandit problem with one safe arm and a risky arm. There are two players and each has an access to such a bandit. A player using the safe arm experiences a safe flow payoff . The risky arm can either be good or bad. A bad risky arm is worse than the safe...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Academy of Management Proceedings
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0065-0668,2151-6561
DOI: 10.5465/ambpp.2019.71