Strategic Behavior in Ascending-Price Multiple-Object Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Asymmetric Multiple-Object First-Price Auctions
The paper reports on the effects of one-sided imperfect information on bidding behaviour in simultaneous and sequential first-price auctions of non-identical objects when bidders have multi-unit demands. The analysis provides the following four main results. First, when different objects are to be sold in sequence, the seller maximises her expected revenues by selling the most valuable object f...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Brazilian Review of Econometrics
سال: 1994
ISSN: 1980-2447
DOI: 10.12660/bre.v14n11994.2976