منابع مشابه
Convergence of strategic behavior to price taking
We address the following issue: what can be said about the degree of competition, in a set of markets with a large number of participants, when no information on the distribution of individual characteristics is available? Our main result is that the proportion of individuals whose strategic behavior differs substantially from price taking, converges to zero as the number of market participants...
متن کاملEntry auctions and strategic behavior under cross - market price constraints
We examine how universal service provisions and price restrictions across markets impact strategic entry and pricing. We develop a simple multi-market model with an oligopolistic (profitable) urban market and entry auctions for (unprofitable) rural service. Cross-market price restrictions induce a firm operating in both markets to become a ‘softer’ competitor, thus placing the firm at a strateg...
متن کاملPrice Taking as the Asymptotic Limit of Strategic Behavior
It is widely accepted among economists that in a system of markets where individual participants are small relative to the market size, individuals have a negligible effect on the determination of market outcomes, so they may be thought of as exhibiting a ’price taking’ behavior. Of course, in order to make sense of this statement one has to attach a meaning to ’a small individual relative to m...
متن کاملReconciling Competitive And Strategic Approaches To Price Discovery In Financial Markets: The Empirical Evidence
Price dynamics are studied on the basis of more than 11,000 transactions from twelve large-scale financial markets experiments. Transaction price changes are strongly correlated with the excess demands that form the core of competitive general equilibrium theory. The evidence for market microstructure theory (which focuses on strategic interaction, appealing to game theory) is more qualified. O...
متن کاملPrice signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities
We analyze trade between a price setting party (seller) who has private information about the quality of a good and a price taker (buyer) who may also have private information. Di erently from most of the literature, we focus on the case in which, under full information, it would be ine cient to trade goods of poor quality. We show that there is a unique equilibrium outcome passing Cho and Krep...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The RAND Journal of Economics
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0741-6261
DOI: 10.2307/2696407