Strategic Arrivals into Queueing Networks: The Network Concert Queueing Game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategic Arrivals into Queueing Networks: The Network Concert Queueing Game
Queueing networks are typically modelled assuming that the arrival process is exogenous, and unaffected by admission control, scheduling policies, etc. In many situations, however, users choose the time of their arrival strategically, taking delay and other metrics into account. In this paper, we develop a framework to study such strategic arrivals into queueing networks. We start by deriving a...
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We introduce the concert or the cafeteria queueing problem: Fixed but a large number of users arrive into a queue which provides service starting at time 0. Users may arrive before 0. They incur a queued waiting cost α ·W , where W is the time to wait in the queue until service, and service time cost β · (t + W ), where t is the arrival time and t + W is the total time until service. Each user ...
متن کاملThe Concert Queueing Game: The Network Case
Queueing networks are typically analyzed assuming that the arrival process is exogenous, and unaffected by admission control, scheduling policies, etc. In many situations arriving users are strategic, and time their arrivals taking delay and other metrics into account. In this paper we study the arrival behavior of such strategizing users at a network of queues. We first consider a single popul...
متن کاملThe concert queueing game: strategic arrivals with waiting and tardiness costs
We consider the non-cooperative choice of arrival times by individual users, whoseek service at a first-come first-served queueing system that opens up at a given time.Each user wishes to obtain service as early as possible, while minimizing the expectedwait in the queue. This problem was recently studied within a simplified fluid-scalemodel. Here we address the unscaled sto...
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The objective of this paper is to dilate the interplay between feedback routing and strategic arrival behavior in single class queueing networks. We study a variation of the ‘Network Concert Queueing Game,’ wherein a fixed but large number of strategic users arrive at a network of queues where they can be routed to other nodes in the network following a fixed routing matrix, or potentially fedb...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Operations Research
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0030-364X,1526-5463
DOI: 10.1287/opre.2014.1338