Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategic Analysis of Petty Corruption with an Intermediary
This note reports part of a larger study of petty corruptionby government bureaucrats in the process of approving new business projects. Each bureaucrat may demand a bribe as a condition of approval. Entrepreneurs use the services of an intermediary who, for a fee, undertakes to obtain all of the required approvals. In a dynamic game model we investigate (1) the multiplicity of equilibria, (2...
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This paper develops a game-theoretic model of petty corruptionby government o¢ cials. Such corruption is widespread, especially (but not only) in developing and transition economies. The model goes beyond the previously published studies in the way it describes the structure of bureaucratic tracks,and the information among the participants. Entrepreneurs apply, in sequence, to a track of ...
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This paper argues that self-reporting schemes whereby citizens report their noncompliance with regulation can prevent corruption in administrations. In our model, entrepreneurs must comply with regulation before undertaking a risky activity. O cials verify compliance before granting permits, and may engage in either bribery or extortion. Without a self-reporting scheme, the government tolerates...
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"Petty corruption and honesty in all health care systems" is the original title of one of the bioethics networks within the worldwide study projects of the International Association of Bioethics. As the coordinator of this network, it still puzzles me why the word "petty" is in the title when in the past few years-through interviews and questionnaires involving 18 countries-it has become eviden...
متن کاملPetty corruption: A game-theoretic approach
The paper explores a game-theoretic model of petty corruption involving a sequence of entrepreneurs and a track of bureaucrats. Each entrepreneur’s project is approved if and only if it is cleared by each bureaucrat. The project value is stochastic; its value is observed only by the entrepreneur, but its distribution is common knowledge. Each bureaucrat clears the project only if a bribe is pai...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economic Design
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1434-4742,1434-4750
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-008-0068-1