Stock Selection Skills of Indian Mutual Fund Managers during 2000-2012

Do Mutual Fund Managers Monitor Executive Compensation?

We find significant relations between active mutual fund portfolio holdings and executive compensation, which appear to be largely driven by mutual fund investment styles rather than monitoring behaviour. Aggressive growth fund holdings are associated with performance pay, while income fund holdings are negatively related. We also find that mutual fund holdings are insensitive to changes in exe...

Mutual fund competition and stock market liquidity

We study how competition in the mutual fund industry affects the stock market and its liquidity. We argue that mutual fund families operate as multi-product firms, jointly choosing fees, performance and number of funds. We show that competition between fund families distorts the incentives to collect information and induces the families to trade off performance and number of funds. An increase ...

Distribution of Individual Stock Performances in a Mutual Fund and the Fund Manager’s Stock Picking Ability

We find that the performance distribution of the individual stocks inside a mutual fund can toss out additional information about the fund manager’s stock picking ability. When a mutual fund contains mostly mediocre-performing stocks but one super-performer, it is likely that the overall fund performance, albeit good, would be due to luck. On the other hand, a fund that has a larger number of a...

Managers, Investors, and Crises: Mutual Fund Strategies in Emerging Markets

Front - Running by Mutual Fund Managers : A Mixed Bag ?

This paper evaluates the welfare implications of front-running by mutual fund managers. It extends the model of Kyle (1985) to a situation in which the insider with fundamentals-information competes against an insider with trade-information and in which noise trading is endogenized. Noise traders are small investors trading through mutual funds to hedge non-tradable or illiquid assets. The insi...