منابع مشابه
Voluntary Disclosure and Strategic Stock Repurchases∗
We study the choice of disclosure and share repurchase strategies of informed managers. Using a model that captures how direct disclosures and share repurchases differentially impact short and long-term stock value, we ask when will they choose disclosure, or repurchases, or both. We find that both direct disclosure and share repurchase policies emerge in equilibrium in different regions of fir...
متن کاملOpen-market Repurchase Announcements, Actual Repurchases, and Stock Price Behavior in Inefficient Markets
In the efficient market framework, it seems difficult to explain why a firm would actually buy back its outstanding shares after the stock price goes up in response to an open-market repurchase announcement. We introduce the subject of market inefficiency in a way similar to the explanation of Shleifer and Vishny (1990, 1997) and reexamine corporate open-market repurchase strategy and stock pri...
متن کاملThe Persistence of Long-Run Abnormal Returns: Evidence from Stock Repurchases and Offerings
Prior studies have documented that stock returns are abnormally high during the years following share repurchases and abnormally low following seasoned equity offerings, relative to various benchmarks of expected returns. While we confirm this evidence in the event data as of 2002, we do not find robust long-run abnormal returns following either stock repurchases or issuances after 2002. Instit...
متن کاملActual Share Repurchases , Price Efficiency , and the Information Content of Stock Prices ∗
We examine the impact of share repurchases on the information content of stock prices using several measures of price efficiency. The study is based on manually collected data on share repurchases in the United States for the period 2004-2010. We find that share repurchases make prices more efficient. In particular, share repurchases increase the accuracy of the stock price after negative infor...
متن کاملShare Repurchases and Employee Compensation
This paper focuses on the agency problem derived from the conict of interest between employees and shareholders. I show that if employees are compensated with restricted stock or stock options, shareholders may engage in opportunistic share repurchases. Equityholders have an incentive to buy back stock after employment contracts have been signed because repurchases increase compensation sensit...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR)
سال: 2011
ISSN: 2157-8834,0892-7626
DOI: 10.19030/jabr.v19i2.2158