Stochastic strategy adjustment in coordination games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Stochastic Strategy Adjustment in Coordination Games
The paper explores a model of equilibrium selection in coordination games, where agents from an infinite population stochastically adjust their strategies to changes in their local environment. Instead of playing perturbed best-response, it is assumed that agents follow a rule of `switching to better strategies with higher probability'. This behavioral rule is related to bounded-rationality mod...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s001990100223