Stochastic Replicator Dynamics
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Stochastic Replicator Dynamics
This article studies the replicator dynamics in the presence of shocks. I show that under these dynamics, strategies that do not survive the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies are eliminated in the long run, even in the presence of nonvanishing perturbations. I also give an example that shows that the stochastic dynamics in this article have equilibrium selection properties that...
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We consider a novel model of stochastic replicator dynamics for potential games that converts to a Langevin equation on a sphere after a change of variables. This is distinct from the models studied earlier. In particular, it is ill-posed due to non-uniqueness of solutions, but is amenable to a natural selection principle that picks a unique solution. The model allows us to make specific statem...
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Population dynamics are often subject to random independent changes in the environment. For the two strategy stochastic replicator dynamic, we assume that stochastic changes in the environment replace the payoffs and variance. This is modeled by a continuous time Markov chain in a finite atom space. We establish conditions for this dynamic to have an analogous characterization of the long-run b...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Economic Review
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0020-6598,1468-2354
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.00071