Stochastic imitative game dynamics with committed agents

نویسندگان

چکیده

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Stochastic imitative game dynamics with committed agents

We consider models of stochastic evolution in two-strategy games in which agents employ imitative decision rules. We introduce committed agents: for each strategy, we suppose that there is at least one agent who plays that strategy without fail. We show that unlike the standard imitative model, the model with committed agents generates unambiguous infinite horizon predictions: the asymptotics o...

متن کامل

Online Appendix to “Stochastic Imitative Game Dynamics with Committed Agents”

In this section, we consider stochastic evolution under two well-known imitative protocols: imitation of success and imitation driven by dissatisfaction. 1 Example O.1.1. Imitation of success. Suppose that when an agent receives a revision opportunity , he randomly samples an opponent, switching to the opponent's strategy with probability proportional to the difference between the opponent's pa...

متن کامل

Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics

Game theory is often described as the study of interactive decision-making by rational agents. However, there are numerous applications of game theory where the agents are not fully rational, yet many of the conclusions remain valid. A case in point is biological competition between species, a topic pioneered by Maynard Smith and Price (1973). In this setting the ‘agents’ are representatives of...

متن کامل

Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics

1.1 Game theory and evolution Modern game theory goes back to a series of papers by the mathematician John von Neumann in the 1920s. This program started a completely new branch of social sciences and applied mathematics. This early work on game theory is summarized in the seminal book " The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior " by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern [115]. Initially , gam...

متن کامل

An economic game with stochastic dynamics

In this paper we investigate a stochastic model for an economic game. To describe this model we have used a Wiener process, as the noise has a stabilization effect. The dynamics are studied in terms of stochastic stability in the stationary state, by constructing the Lyapunov exponent, depending on the parameters that describe the model. The numerical simulation that we did justifies the theore...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory

سال: 2012

ISSN: 0022-0531

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.018