منابع مشابه
The Asymptotic Value in Finite Stochastic Games
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متن کاملImitation Games
Mutual imitation games among artificial birds are studied. By employing a variety of mappings and game rules, the evolution to the edge between chaos and windows is universally confirmed. Some other general features are observed, including punctuated equilibria, and successive alternations of dominant species with temporal complexity. Diversity of species aided by the symbolization of artificia...
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In games with a large number of players where players may have overlapping objectives, the analysis of stable outcomes typically depends on player types. A special case is when a large part of the player population consists of imitation types: that of players who imitate choice of other (optimizing) types. Game theorists typically study the evolution of such games in dynamical systems with imit...
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An imitation game is a finite two person normal form game in which the two players have the same set of pure strategies and the goal of the second player is to choose the same pure strategy as the first player. Gale et al. (1950) gave a way of passing from a given two person game to a symmetric game whose symmetric Nash equilibria are in oneto-one correspondence with the Nash equilibria of the ...
متن کاملSophisticated imitation in cyclic games
Individuals belonging to two large populations are repeatedly randomly matched to play a cyclic 2× 2 game such as Matching Pennies. Between matching rounds, individuals sometimes change their strategy after observing a finite sample of other outcomes within their population. Individuals from the same population follow the same behavioral rule. In the resulting discrete time dynamics the unique ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.01.004