منابع مشابه
Stochastic Games on a Product State Space
Stochastic games and product-games. An n-player stochastic game is given by (1) a set of players N = 1 n , (2) a nonempty and finite set of states S, (3) for each state s ∈ S, a nonempty and finite set of actions As for each player i, (4) for each state s ∈ S and each joint action as ∈×i∈N As , a payoff r i s as ∈ to each player i, (5) for each state s ∈ S and each joint action as ∈×i∈N As , a ...
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Discrete-time stochastic games with a finite number of states have been widely applied to study the strategic interactions among forward-looking players in dynamic environments. The model as written down by Ericson & Pakes (1995), Pakes & McGuire (1994, 2001) (hereafter, EP, PM1, and PM2), the subsequent literature (e.g., Gowrisankaran 1999, Fershtman & Pakes 2000, Benkard 2004), and in standar...
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We consider a zero-sum stochastic game with side constraints for both players with a special structure. There are two independent controlled Markov chains, one for each player. The transition probabilities of the chain associated with a player as well as the related side constraints depend only on the actions of the corresponding player; the side constraints also depend on the player’s controll...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 1980
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/bf01784794