Stochastic Equilibria: Noise in Actions or Beliefs?
نویسندگان
چکیده
We introduce noisy belief equilibrium (NBE) for normal-form games in which players best respond to realizations. Axioms restrict distributions be unbiased with respect and responsive changes the opponents’ behavior. The axioms impose testable restrictions both within across games, we compare these those of regular quantal response (QRE) are placed on function as primitive. NBE can generate similar predictions QRE several classes games. Unlike QRE, is a refinement rationalizability invariant affine transformations payoffs. (JEL C72, D83, D91)
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1945-7669', '1945-7685']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20190013