Stochastic Contests with Linex Utility Functions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Contests with a stochastic number of players
We study Tullock’s (1980) n-player contest when each player has an independent probability 0 < p ≤ 1 of participating. A unique symmetric equilibrium is found for any n and p and its properties are analyzed. In particular, we show that for a fixed n > 2 individual equilibrium spending as a function of p is single-peaked and satisfies a single-crossing property for any two different numbers of p...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Alphanumeric Journal
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2148-2225
DOI: 10.17093/alphanumeric.456860