Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata
We consider a game in which “meta-players” choose finite automata to play a repeated stage game. Meta-players’ utilities are lexicographic, first increasing in the (limit-of-the-means) payoffs of the repeated game and second decreasing in the number of states in their automaton. We examine the outcomes in this game which satisfy a version of evolutionary stability that has been modified to perm...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0165-1889
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2009.02.007