Stephen Morris

Stephen Morris Risk , Uncertainty and Hidden Information

People are less willing to accept bets about an event when they do not know the true probability of that event. Such “uncertainty aversion” has been used to explain certain economic phenomena. This paper considers how far standard private information explanations (with strategic decisions to accept bets) can go in explaining phenomena attributed to uncertainty aversion. This paper shows that if...

SOCIAL VALUE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION BY STEPHEN MORRIS and HYUN

A Comment on “The Welfare Effects of Public Information" by Stephen Morris and Hyun

We re-examine the Morris and Shin (2002) model, but assume that players hold proper priors. This sharply alters equilibrium behavior, and welfare, particularly when coordination dominates individual payoffs. Whereas under improper priors the social value of public information is smallest, and possibly negative, in these situations, this is never true under proper priors. When coordination matte...

Stephen Morris “ Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost - Public Monitoring ” PIER Working

Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing publicmonitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in such games. It is always possible to coordinate continuation play by requiring behavior to have bound...

George J . Mailath , and Stephen Morris “ A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information

We study perfect information games with an infinite horizon played by an arbitrary number of players. This class of games includes infinitely repeated perfect information games, repeated games with asynchronous moves, games with long and short run players, games with overlapping generations of players, and canonical non-cooperative models of bargaining. We consider two restrictions on equilibri...