STATISTICAL RESEARCH ON LOCAL BUDGET’S REVENUE FORMATION AMIDST DECENTRALIZATION
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Financial and credit activity: problems of theory and practice
سال: 2021
ISSN: 2310-8770,2306-4994
DOI: 10.18371/fcaptp.v1i36.227916