State-Policy Dynamics in Evolutionary Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games.
Evolutionary game theory describes systems where individual success is based on the interaction with others. We consider a system in which players unconditionally imitate more successful strategies but sometimes also explore the available strategies at random. Most research has focused on how strategies spread via genetic reproduction or cultural imitation, but random exploration of the availab...
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Evolutionary games have been introduced by Maynard Smith and Price [1973] in the early 70’s with the aim to study the stability of populations in time. In the general model, a population consists of finitely many different types that interact randomly with each other, where each interaction leads to fitness payoffs for each of the types involved. Consequently, the population distribution over t...
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Darwinian dynamics based on mutation and selection form the core of mathematical models for adaptation and coevolution of biological populations. The evolutionary outcome is often not a fitness-maximizing equilibrium but can include oscillations and chaos. For studying frequency-dependent selection, game-theoretic arguments are more appropriate than optimization algorithms. Replicator and adapt...
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There is much empirical evidence that human decisionmaking under risk does not correspond the decision-theoretic notion of “rational” decision making, namely to make choices that maximize the expected value. An open question is how such behavior could have arisen evolutionarily. We believe that the answer to this question lies, at least in part, in the interplay between risk-taking and sequenti...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Dynamic Games and Applications
سال: 2016
ISSN: 2153-0785,2153-0793
DOI: 10.1007/s13235-016-0208-0