State fragility, rent seeking and lobbying: evidence from African data
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Rent-Seeking and Innovation
Innovations and their adoption are the keys to growth and development. Innovations are less socially useful, but more profitable for the innovator, when they are adopted slowly and the innovator remains a monopolist. For this reason, rent-seeking, both public and private, plays an important role in determining the social usefulness of innovations. This paper examines the political economy of in...
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Why has the macroeconomic impact of foreign aid seemingly been so poor? Is there a relationship between the widespread level of corruption and other types of rent-seeking activities and concessional assistance? To answer these questions we provide a simple game-theoretic rent-seeking model. The model has a number of implications. First, under certain circumstances, an increase in government rev...
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This paper shows that a policy that uniformly increases contestants e¤ort costs can lead to an increase in total e¤ort. In asymmetric settings, this levels the playing eldand therefore encourages weaker players (who otherwise would have stayed out) to enter. Paradoxically, a contest designer whose only objective is to maximize total e¤ort may thus wish to make rent-seeking more di¢ cult. ...
متن کاملSequential rent seeking ∗
We consider n firms which choose rent-seeking expenditures sequentially, each player anticipating the rent-seeking expenditures that will be made by later movers. We find that the earlier movers need not make larger profits than later movers, and that aggregate profits are lower than in a game in which firms make simultaneous moves.
متن کاملInfluencing rent-seeking contests
This paper shows that a policy that uniformly increases contestants’ effort costs can lead to an increase in total effort. In asymmetric settings, this “levels the playing field” and therefore encourages weaker players (who otherwise would have stayed out) to enter. Paradoxically, a contest designer whose only objective is to maximize total effort may thus wish to make rent-seeking “more diffic...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Social Economics
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0306-8293
DOI: 10.1108/ijse-11-2014-0234