State-dependent congestion pricing with reference-dependent preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bargaining with Reference Dependent Preferences
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Transportation Research Part B: Methodological
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0191-2615
DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2011.06.003