Standard-Setting Organizations: Patents, Price Fixing, and Per Se Legality
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Standard Setting Organizations and Standard Essential Patents: Voting and Markets
The key finding is that Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) choose effi cient technology standards because voting power and market power have counterbalancing effects. Agents on the long side of the market have less added value in the marketplace but more voting power in cooperative organizations and conversely for the short side of the market. In a two-stage model, industry members choose te...
متن کاملPatents and the Performance of Voluntary Standard-Setting Organizations
This paper measures the technological significance of voluntary standard setting organizations (SSOs) by examining citations to patents disclosed in the standard setting process. We find that SSO patents are cited far more frequently than a set of control patents, and that SSO patents receive citations for a much longer period of time. Furthermore, we find a significant correlation between cita...
متن کاملStandard Setting Organizations and Standard Essential Patents: Voting Power versus Market Power
The key nding is that Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) choose e¢ cient technology standards because voting power and market power have counterbalancing e¤ects. Agents on the long side of the market have less added value in the marketplace but more voting power in cooperative organizations and conversely for the short side of the market. In a two-stage model, industry members choose techno...
متن کاملStandard Setting, Patents, and Hold-up
Standard setting raises a variety of antitrust issues. Cooperative standard setting often involves horizontal competitors agreeing on certain specifications of the products they plan to market, implicating core antitrust issues regarding the boundary between cooperation and collusion. The American Bar Association’s Handbook on the Antitrust Aspects of Standards Setting presents legal analysis o...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The University of Chicago Law Review
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0041-9494
DOI: 10.2307/1600663