Stackelberg Strategies for Network Design Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Stackelberg Games for Vaccine Design
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Internet Mathematics
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1542-7951,1944-9488
DOI: 10.1080/15427951.2012.727772