Stackelberg Routing in Atomic Network Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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An effective means to reduce the inefficiency of Nash flows in nonatomic network routing games is to impose tolls on the arcs of the network. It is a well-known fact that marginal cost tolls induce a Nash flow that corresponds to a minimum cost flow. However, despite their effectiveness, marginal cost tolls suffer from two major drawbacks, namely (i) that potentially every arc of the network is...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.987115