Stackelberg pricing games with congestion effects
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract We study a Stackelberg game with multiple leaders and continuum of followers that are coupled via congestion effects. The followers’ problem constitutes nonatomic game, where population infinitesimal players is given each player chooses resource. Each resource has linear cost function which depends on the this control determine price per unit as well service capacity for influencing slope function. As our main result, we establish existence pure-strategy Nash–Stackelberg equilibria multi-leader game. result requires completely new proof approach compared to previous approaches, since leaders’ objective functions discontinuous in consequence, best responses do not always exist, thus standard fixed-point arguments á la Kakutani (Duke Math J 8(3):457–458, 1941) directly applicable. show C -secure (a concept introduced by Reny (Econometrica 67(5):1029–1056, 1999) refined McLennan et al. 79(5):1643–1664, 2011), leads an equilibrium. furthermore equilibrium essentially unique, analyze its efficiency social optimum. prove worst-case quality unbounded. For identical leaders, derive closed-form expression
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Programming
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0025-5610', '1436-4646']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-021-01672-9