منابع مشابه
Girth, minimum degree, independence, and broadcast independence
An independent broadcast on a connected graph $G$is a function $f:V(G)to mathbb{N}_0$such that, for every vertex $x$ of $G$, the value $f(x)$ is at most the eccentricity of $x$ in $G$,and $f(x)>0$ implies that $f(y)=0$ for every vertex $y$ of $G$ within distance at most $f(x)$ from $x$.The broadcast independence number $alpha_b(G)$ of $G$is the largest weight $sumlimits_{xin V(G)}f(x)$of an ind...
متن کاملStackelberg versus Cournot Equilibrium
We reconsider Stackelberg’s classical critique of the Cournot duopoly, in the framework of endogenous timing for two-player games. For quantity duopoly we provide different sets of minimal conditions, directly on the demand and cost functions, yielding respectively the simultaneous and the two sequential modes of play. While our findings essentially confirm the predominance of the former, they ...
متن کاملOn Stackelberg Mixed Strategies
It is sometimes the case that one solution concept in game theory is equivalent to applying another solution concept to a modified version of the game. In such cases, does it make sense to study the former separately (as it applies to the original representation of the game), or should we entirely subordinate it to the latter? The answer probably depends on the particular circumstances, and ind...
متن کاملRobust Stackelberg Communications Games
This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users, namely leaders who possess system information, and followers who have no such information, by using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, leaders play and choose their actions based on their information about the system, and followers choose their actions myopically, according to their observations of t...
متن کاملEndogenous Stackelberg Leadership
We consider a linear quantity setting duopoly game and analyze which of the players will commit when both players have the possibility to do so. To that end, we study a 2-stage game in which each player can either commit to a quantity in stage 1 or wait till stage 2. We show that committing is more risky for the high cost rm and that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Industrial Economics
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0022-1821,1467-6451
DOI: 10.1111/joie.12244