منابع مشابه
Stable sets in one-seller assignment games
We consider von Neumann – Morgenstern stable sets in assignment games with one seller and many buyers. We prove that a set of imputations is a stable set if and only if it is the graph of a certain type of continuous and monotone function. This characterization enables us to interpret the standards of behavior encompassed by the various stable sets as possible outcomes of well-known auction pro...
متن کاملStable sets in three agent pillage games∗
We consider pillage games as in Jordan [2006, “Pillage and property”, JET] and show that, for anonymous, three agent pillage games: when the core is non-empty, it must take one of five forms; all such pillage games with an empty core represent the same dominance relation; when a stable set exists, and the game also satisfies a continuity and a responsiveness assumption, it is unique and contain...
متن کاملFarsighted stable sets in Hotelling's location games
We apply farsighted stable set to two versions of Hotelling’s location games: one with linear market and another with circular market. It is shown that there always exists a farsighted stable set in both games. In particular, the set of all location profiles that yields equal payoff across all players is shown to be a farsighted stable set. This stable set contains location profiles that reflec...
متن کاملPillage games with multiple stable sets
We prove that pillage games [Jordan, 2006, “Pillage and property”, JET] can have multiple stable sets, constructing pillage games with up to 2 n−1 3 stable sets, when the number of agents, n, exceeds four. We do so by violating the anonymity axiom common to the existing literature, instead endowing some agents to overpower all but a small number of opposing configurations of agents. Thus, when ...
متن کاملC-complete sets for compromise stable games
The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal vector corresponds to an ordering of the players and describes the efficient payoff vector giving the first players in the ordering their utopia demand as long as it is still possible to assign the remaining players at least their minimum right. A game is called compromise stable...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Annals of Operations Research
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0254-5330,1572-9338
DOI: 10.1007/s10479-013-1439-8