Stable sets for asymmetric information economies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Economies with Asymmetric Information and Individual Risk ∗
In economies with asymmetric information agents have private information on economically relevant variables: on individual states (economies with private information), on the action taken (moral hazard), on their type (adverse selection). We analyze competitive equilibria of these economies in the tradition of Prescott and Townsend ([9]). It is known that economies with adverse selection behave...
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We consider a contracting problem in which a rm outsources its call center operations to a service provider. The outsourcing rm (which we term the originator) has private information regarding the rate of incoming calls. The per-call revenue (or margin) earned by the rm and the service level depend on the sta¢ ng decisions by the service provider. Initially, we restrict attention to pay-per-...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1742-7355
DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12057