منابع مشابه
Stable marriages and search frictions
Stable matchings are the primary solution concept for two-sided matching markets with nontransferable utility. We investigate the strategic foundations of stability in a decentralized matching market. Towards this end, we embed the standard marriage markets in a search model with random meetings. We study the limit of steady-state equilibria as exogenous frictions vanish. The main result is tha...
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THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES has as its aim to promote the sciences and strengthen their influence in society.
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We provide algorithms guaranteeing high levels of privacy by computing uniformly random solutions to stable marriages problems. We also provide efficient algorithms extracting a nonuniformly random solution and guaranteeing t-privacy for any threshold t. The most private solution is expensive and is based on a distributed/shared CSP model of the problem. The most efficient version is based on r...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.11.001