Stable cores in information graph games
نویسندگان
چکیده
In an information graph situation, a finite set of agents and source are the nodes undirected with property that two adjacent can share at no cost. The has some (or technology), in same component as reach this for free. other components, agent must pay unitary cost to obtain information. We prove core derived game is von Neumann-Morgenstern stable if only cycle-complete, or equivalently concave. Otherwise, whether there always exists open question. If consists ring contains source, it related situation where one edge been deleted.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['0899-8256', '1090-2473']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.013