Stability with one-sided incomplete information

ON A MARKOV GAME WITH ONE-SIDED INCOMPLETE INFORMATION By

We apply the average cost optimality equation to zero-sum Markov games, by considering a simple game with one-sided incomplete information that generalizes an example of Aumann and Maschler (1995). We determine the value and identify the optimal strategies for a range of parameters.

Two-sided Matching with Incomplete Information∗

Stability in a two-sided matching model with non-transferrable utility and with incomplete information is investigated. Each agent has interdependent preferences which depend on his own type and on the possibly unknown types of agents on the other side of the market. In a one-sided incomplete information model in which workers’ types are private information, a firm joins a worker in a block to ...

An Experimental Study of Buyer-Seller Negotiation with One-Sided Incomplete Information and Time Discounting

We study a multi-period bargaining mechanism in which a seller negotiates with a buyer over the price of an indivisible good. It is common knowledge that the good has zero value to the seller. Its value to the buyer is privately known, distributed independently of the seller's value according to a distribution that is common knowledge. Bargaining proceeds as follows. The seller sets a price and...

One-Sided Interval Trees

We give an alternative treatment and extension of some results of Itoh and Mahmoud on one-sided interval trees. The proofs are based on renewal theory, including a case with mixed multiplicative and additive renewals.

One-Sided Stability of Medial Axis Transform