Stability of equilibria for population games with uncertain parameters under bounded rationality
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Inequalities and Applications
سال: 2021
ISSN: 1029-242X
DOI: 10.1186/s13660-020-02544-0