Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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where the the last inequality holds since mA(s) < mA(1) for s < 1. Note that A benefits from the deviation since it admits more students without exceeding its capacity. Similarly, if mA(0) > κ, then A can benefit by rejecting mA(0) − κ of students. Thus, we must have mA(0) ≤ κ ≤ mA(1) in equilibrium. Step 2. In equilibrium, there is a unique ŝi ∈ (0, 1), for i = A,B, such that mi(ŝi) = κ. Proof...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1933-6837
DOI: 10.3982/te1731