Stability and cooperative solution in stochastic games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Cooperative Solution of Stochastic Games
Building on the work of Nash, Harsanyi, and Shapley, we define a cooperative solution for strategic games that takes account of both the competitive and the cooperative aspects of such games. We prove existence in the general (NTU) case and uniqueness in the TU case. Our main result is an extension of the definition and the existence and uniqueness theorems to stochastic games discounted or und...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theory and Decision
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0040-5833,1573-7187
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-017-9619-7