Sponsored Search Auction Considering Combinational Bids with Externalities
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEICE Transactions on Information and Systems
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0916-8532,1745-1361
DOI: 10.1587/transinf.2016agp0009