منابع مشابه
Specifying nonspecific evidence
In an earlier article [J. Schubert, “On nonspecific evidence,” Int. J. Intell. Syst. 8(6), 711−725 (1993)] we established within Dempster-Shafer theory a criterion function called the metaconflict function. With this criterion we can partition into subsets a set of several pieces of evidence with propositions that are weakly specified in the sense that it may be uncertain to which event a propo...
متن کاملFinding a posterior Domain Probability Distribution by Specifying Nonspecific Evidence
This article is an extension of the results of two earlier articles. In [J. Schubert, “On nonspecific evidence”, Int. J. Intell. Syst. 8 (1993) 711-725] we established within Dempster-Shafer theory a criterion function called the metaconflict function. With this criterion we can partition into subsets a set of several pieces of evidence with propositions that are weakly specified in the sense t...
متن کاملOn nonspecific evidence
When simultaneously reasoning with evidences about several different events it is necessary to separate the evidence according to event. These events should then be handled independently. However, when propositions of evidences are weakly specified in the sense that it may not be certain to which event they are referring, this may not be directly possible. In this paper a criterion for partitio...
متن کاملIntentional and unintentional contributions to nonspecific preparation: electrophysiological evidence.
The authors hypothesized that there are distinct intentional and unintentional influences on nonspecific preparation for a future event. In 2 experiments, participants responded to an imperative stimulus (S-sub-2) that was presented equiprobably either 400 ms or 1,200 ms after the offset of a warning stimulus (S-sub-1). During the S-sub-1-S-sub-2 interval, the authors measured the contingent ne...
متن کاملModeling scientific evidence: the challenge of specifying likelihoods
In science evidence is objective. Whether data count as evidence for or against a hypothesis should not depend on my unconstrained subjective degrees of belief. Philosophical models of confirmation should aim to capture, in at least some respects, the objective character of scientific evidence. Indeed, this aim drives the resistance to subjective Bayesianism, leading to the development of objec...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Intelligent Systems
سال: 1998
ISSN: 0884-8173,1098-111X
DOI: 10.1002/(sici)1098-111x(199608)11:8<525::aid-int2>3.0.co;2-n