Spatial evolutionary games with weak selection
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Spatial evolutionary games with weak selection.
Recently, a rigorous mathematical theory has been developed for spatial games with weak selection, i.e., when the payoff differences between strategies are small. The key to the analysis is that when space and time are suitably rescaled, the spatial model converges to the solution of a partial differential equation (PDE). This approach can be used to analyze all [Formula: see text] games, but t...
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In evolutionary games, reproductive success is determined by payoffs. Weak selection means that even large differences in game outcomes translate into small fitness differences. Many results have been derived using weak selection approximations, in which perturbation analysis facilitates the derivation of analytical results. Here, we ask whether results derived under weak selection are also qua...
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All biological systems are, at some level, guided by the laws of natural selection and evolutionary dynamics. Adaptations with increased fitness tend to proliferate and fixate within populations. Those situations in which an individual’s fitness depends not only upon a static environment, but upon the fluctuating phenotypes of the surrounding population, fall within the domain of evolutionary g...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0027-8424,1091-6490
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1620852114